Standing Committee E

[Dame Marion Roe in the Chair]

Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Bill [Lords]

Marion Roe: I remind the Committee that there is a Ways and Means resolution in connection with the Bill. Copies are available in the Room.

Paul Goggins: On a point of order, Dame Marion. I know that the amendments on victims' issues, particularly the proposed surcharge, have been eagerly awaited. They will be tabled this morning, while the Committee is sitting. I have made arrangements with officials for the amendments to be distributed to hon. Members at the end of the sitting.

Marion Roe: Thank you very much. Let me add that I have verified that the air conditioning is working, and we have opened a window. However, because it is so hot in the Room, hon. Members may remove their jackets if they so wish.Clause 6 Evidence and procedure: courts-martial

Clause 6 - Evidence and procedure: courts-martial

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Marion Roe: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Government new clause 18—Evidence and procedure: England and Wales.
 Government new clause 19—Evidence and procedure: Northern Ireland.

Paul Goggins: New clause 18 makes provision for evidential and procedural changes in trials involving familial homicide in England and Wales. New clause 19 makes similar provision for Northern Ireland, and clause 6 does the same for courts martial. My comments will be about all three.
 In the debate on clause 5, we explored at some length the loophole in current law whereby those who kill a child or vulnerable adult can escape justice. Such cases arise when a vulnerable person has been unlawfully killed and the killer or killers must belong to a small and closed group of people, all of whom are suspects and, often, the only witnesses. In the face of their determined silence, the prosecution may be unable to identify the actual killer. Many hon. Members share our concern that something must be done. I am sorry to say that some of us have constituents who have been directly affected by the apparent powerlessness of the legal system in such cases. Their grief at losing a loved one in the most horrendous circumstances is only made more terrible to bear by the anger and frustration that comes from knowing that the perpetrator has got away scot-free. 
 Let me again make it clear that we are not willing to accept the current situation. We are determined to 
 reform the law to ensure that a greater number of offenders are brought to justice in such sort of cases. The new offence in clause 5 is an important part of that reform, but it is not on its own the solution to the problem. The clauses before us are no less essential to ensuring the effectiveness of our scheme. 
 A key problem in pursuing murder and manslaughter convictions in cases of familial homicide is that the case can be withdrawn at half-time—after the prosecution has put its case—on the basis that there is no case to answer. That is because the prosecution, in cases in which there is more than one accused, may not have been able to produce enough evidence by that stage to show which of the accused actually caused the death, or whether it was a joint enterprise. The clauses are designed to overcome that obstacle and to allow more charges of murder or manslaughter safely to be left to the jury to decide. That is an important aim, because, as I said on Second Reading, a conviction for the new offence under clause 5 would not be a just outcome if it could be shown that a defendant was in fact guilty of murder or manslaughter. 
 As hon. Members know, the Law Commission has undertaken a great deal of helpful work on the issue. In its report ''Children: Their Non-Accidental Death or Serious Injury'', it recommended that it should be permissible for adverse inferences to be drawn, subject to certain safeguards, where the other evidence did not amount to a technical case to answer.

David Heath: The hon. Gentleman will recall that the Law Commission proposals were based not only on that premise, but on a statutory duty that the defendant would be required to fulfil; if he did not fulfil it, the jury would be able to draw an inference. Why have the Government omitted that essential part of the proposals?

Paul Goggins: I am sure that we will discuss the differences, slight though they may be, between the Law Commission's recommendations and our proposals. The main reason for them is that the offences that the Law Commission proposed are different from the new offence that we are proposing in clause 5. Its proposals were for an offence of aggravated child cruelty and failure to protect. The Law Commission has undertaken a great deal of helpful work on the issue. We are seeking to reflect both principles in the clauses, although the circumstances in which our procedural measures are triggered differ slightly, as I have just mentioned. We have linked our procedural measures closely to the circumstances of our proposed new offence, and we believe that that produces a coherent and effective package of measures targeted specifically on cases of familial homicide.
 On Second Reading, the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) indicated that many concerns that were raised in the other place about the proposals' compatibility with human rights, and added his voice to those expressions of concern. We believe that the provisions are wholly compatible with the rights of defendants under article 6 of the European convention on human rights—the right to a fair trial. Crucially, the Joint Committee on Human 
 Rights gave the measures a clean bill of health: I refer hon. Members to the Joint Committee's fourth report of this Session, which sets out why it came to that conclusion. 
 Our proposals would take effect only in trials involving both a charge of murder or manslaughter and a charge of the new offence under clause 5. However, their operation would be subject to certain safeguards. The link with clause 5 is important in that context. The proposed procedural and evidential measures would come into play only when a case to answer in respect of the new offence under clause 5 is made out against the defendant in the standard way, and only when that same defendant may also have committed the murder or manslaughter. 
 The first measure is seen when there is a clear set of circumstances calling for an explanation from the defendant. We think that his or her failure at trial to give any evidence in his or her defence, or his or her refusal to answer certain questions put to him or her should lead to the possibility of adverse inferences being drawn from that silence in wider circumstances than would currently be available. Secondly, we want to ensure that there is an opportunity for all the evidence in the case to be heard, so the clauses provide that in certain circumstances, the question whether the evidence against the defendant constitutes a case to answer should not be considered until all the evidence in the case has been heard. Both the drawing of adverse inferences from the defendant's silence and the postponement of the ''case to answer'' decision were recommended by the Law Commission in its report. 
 I move now to the provisions for courts martial. Clause 6 ensures that if a case involving an offence under clause 5 is tried by a court martial, the procedural and evidential provisions that I have described will apply. Courts martial have the power to try persons subject to service law for civilian offences. Persons subject to service law include service personnel at all times, their families when they accompany service personnel abroad, and civilians and their families who accompany or are employed by the armed forces abroad. We have a sizeable community of service and civilian families abroad, particularly in Germany and working in NATO headquarters around Europe. 
 If an instance of the offence under clause 5 occurs in a situation in which a court martial rather than a civilian court is to try the case, our procedural and evidential measures must also apply. Subsection (2) is required because, when civilian offences are tried by courts martial, the charges are laid under the sections listed in that subsection. Subsection (3) reflects the court martial procedures whereby any inference of guilt is drawn by the court, which is composed of a panel of military officers sitting with a judge advocate.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: The Minister will recall that when we changed the law and updated it in relation to courts martial, differences between each of the three armed services remained. Will the procedure in respect of the new offence be the same for all three armed services in courts martial?

Paul Goggins: My understanding is that it will apply equally to all three, but I will have that checked. If my assurance is not right, I will correct it later in our deliberations.
 We consider that the circumstances of the new offence under clause 5 are such that, where there is a case to answer in respect of that offence, the prosecution will have shown evidence that the defendant is connected with the offence in such a way that it is fair and proper for the procedures in the clauses to apply. By postponing the decision on whether there is a case to answer and enabling an inference to be drawn in circumstances in which that would not currently be possible, we consider that more of these cases will be able to safely be left to the jury. The new offence under clause 5 will help to pin responsibility for the unlawful death of a child or vulnerable adult in specific circumstances to the people or person who caused it. Only when that is coupled with the procedural measures in these provisions will we be able to ensure, as far as we possibly can, that full justice can be done.

Dominic Grieve: I have listened with great care to the Minister has said, and I am mindful of the Law Commission proposals. I hope that he will forgive me if, notwithstanding the proposals and the rationale behind them, I take a little of the Committee's time to express my anxiety about the proposals in new clause 18—anxiety that is not merely theoretical or based on abstract legal principles, but rooted in practical reality.
 As the Minister is aware, at present if a person is charged with an offence—other than certain minor categories of administrative offences in which the burden of proof is reversed—it is for the prosecution to establish its case. If at the end of presenting its case, the prosecution cannot show a prima facie case against a defendant, defence counsel will seek the court's ruling that there is no case to answer, because the evidence is insufficient for it to go to the jury, regardless of whether other evidence was adduced. It is a long-established principle in our law that in those circumstances defendants are entitled to the benefit of the prosecution's failure to establish a case: they do not have to answer that case in any way and they are entitled to be acquitted. 
 Clause 5, as we discussed on Tuesday, creates a new offence that is designed to get round—a aim to which I am wholly sympathetic—the long-standing problem of what to do when two defendants are charged with the murder of a child or a vulnerable adult but, although one can be certain that one of them did it, one cannot say for certain which of the two it was. The Government's solution is to create a fresh offence, which, as we discussed on Tuesday, is based on negligence and on the duty that the person in the household will owe to the child or vulnerable adult. I have no difficulty with that, as I explained to the Minister. It must follow that, because it is a negligence offence, the sorts of problems that are likely to arise, or have arisen in the past, in murder trials in which one cannot tell which of two people has committed the offence will be circumvented if the prosecution in presenting its case has established the basic 
 ingredients: that the child or vulnerable adult was a member of the same household and that there was frequent contact, so the defendant was a person who came into the relevant category; that at the time there was a significant risk of serious physical harm—presumably there will be other evidence that the child had suffered harm or that harm had been reported—and that the person either was likely to have caused the death, or failed the three tests in clause 5(1)(d)(i) to (iii). By doing thus, the prosecution will have made the case. If in those circumstances a defendant chose, after half-time—the case would certainly go beyond half-time if those ingredients had been established—not to go into the witness box to provide an explanation, or refused to answer questions, then, very properly, under our well established inference rules, it would be possible to draw adverse inferences from that. I expect that it is extremely likely that the defendant, or both defendants if there were two, would be convicted of the offence under clause 5 and so liable to 14 years' imprisonment. 
 Now, however, the Government are seeking to establish what I can only describe as a double whammy of procedure and evidence by linking the new offence to the continuation of a murder trial beyond half-time when there is no evidence that would take it beyond half-time in the hope that the defendants will be coerced—or feel under an obligation—to give evidence in the witness box because they face the double whammy. Although they might not wish to give evidence because they know that then they would be unlikely to be convicted of murder, but they might wish to give evidence because without it they are certain to be convicted of the negligence offence. That is the double whammy: if one does not go down one road, one renders oneself likely to suffer a worse outcome on the other. That is the Government's intention, and what their proposal is designed achieve. 
 We have to be realistic about how the outcome will emerge. Let me give an example, which may be helpful. A child is killed, and the two parents are in the dock. It is very likely that one or other committed the offence—the evidence is pretty clear. In interviews under caution, they have blamed each other, but that evidence can only be used against the person who gave it and not against the other person. The trial gets to half-time, and it is abundantly clear that there is no evidence in relation to the murder to take the trial beyond half-time. However, there is plenty of evidence to take it beyond half-time on the basis of the negligence offence under clause 5, which is why that offence has been created. The amendment would ensure that the trial for the murder could continue beyond half-time even though the prosecution had failed to establish its case. As a result, during the defence case, the two defendants will be obliged to go into the witness box and to give evidence against each other that could be—because all evidence is evidence—used by the prosecution to establish the offence against the one or the other. 
 By illustrating the matter in that way, I hope that I have highlighted the danger. At the end of the trial, the judge will face the fact that the prosecution has never 
 been able to get over the hurdle of establishing murder in adducing its own evidence, but both defendants would have been forced into the witness box and publicly blamed each other on oath for committing the offence. Both are almost certainly be guilty of the negligence offence, but the jury would be left with the happy task of disentangling which of the two defendants has been telling the truth about the other. That is a recipe for miscarriages of justice, because the only evidence at the end of the trial would be the two co-accused blaming each other. The judge would have to direct the jury about the dangers of the two people's respective evidence and say that it should be approached with caution, but that might well be evidence that a jury could properly consider at that stage. It will be very difficult for jurors who, although they might sometimes get it right, might equally through no fault of their own get it wrong because we have removed one of the basic rules protecting defendants by allowing the case to go beyond half-time on the murder charge when it should not have been allowed to do so. 
 I accept that this is a very difficult issue. I share the Minister's desire to see people who commit serious offences punished for them. However, we have to be realistic. I am trying to do that rather than quoting a theoretical principle of law that it is absolutely wrong that the moment of ''no case to answer'' should be moved to the end of the defence case. I am not arguing that, because I can see what is intended. However, in practice, the provision is going to cause considerable difficulties. I should be grateful if the Minister or another member of the Committee provided a critique of what I have said—I am open-minded. However, I am truly anxious that, far from producing the intended result, we will end up with lots of cases going to the Court of Appeal long after the event and the Court saying that the conviction is unsafe and unsatisfactory. 
 I would prefer to accept that in this type of case it will never be established—unless there is extraneous evidence—who did the murder and that we should have a substitute offence, which is what clause 5 is all about. However, if we do that, we do not need new clause 18, which twists the procedural rules to try to create the potential for a double result—that is to say that by using the mechanism of the new negligence offence it will be possible to secure the conviction on the murder offence that had previously been impossible to achieve. That troubles me. 
 What if the Home Office Minister had come before the Committee and said, ''Forget about the negligence offence. We are going to say that in murder trials in which one of two people might have committed the offence, we will remove the right to have a 'no case to answer' at half-time and move it to the end of the defence case''? If we look at the stark reality of the Government's proposals, we see that that is what we are doing. We could apply that rule of law throughout all criminal trials, but the Government have not suggested that that should happen. Therefore, I have anxieties about the theoretical erosion of a principle of law that has been well and long established in this country, but I am prepared to be persuaded in the 
 present case. Then, I want to be persuaded that the measure will actually work in practice. As I have explained, I have serious doubts about that.

David Heath: I share the hon. Gentleman's anxiety. I indicated on Second Reading that I, too, am willing to be persuaded because I am keen to have a workable legal process that gives us an effective means of establishing the guilt of a person who has committed an awful crime. However, I worry because although the Minister has prayed in aid the work of the Law Commission and said how carefully it considered the matter before making proposals, the proposals of the Law Commission are not the proposals that the Government have put before us; they differ in substantial ways.
 First, the Law Commission proposals on changes of procedure did not apply to murder and manslaughter; they applied to the new offence. That is a critical difference. Secondly, there is a matter of great importance that the Minister did not properly address in answering my intervention. The Law Commission proposed a new requirement on the defendant or, before charge, the prospective defendant to provide a sworn statement of the circumstances of the child's death that could be used in evidence. The failure to fulfil that requirement was to be a matter from which the jury could draw an appropriate inference. That, too, is critical to the operation of this part of the Bill. 
 Now, nobody will be required to provide information in advance. The prosecutor will mount the case against one or more accused and the judge will be able to rule that there is no case to answer at the halfway stage, but only on the ground that the person does not fall within the relevant categories of being within the household and having contact with the child or vulnerable person, and so on. The defence will then be asked to present a case and, if it chooses not to, the jury will be entitled to draw an adverse inference and the judge can determine whether there is a case to answer. 
 What is the difference between the two? If the prosecution has failed to make a case sufficient to result in a verdict of guilt in the most serious cases—guilt of murder or manslaughter—there is no case to answer; but two minutes later, after the defence counsel has stood up and said that there is no evidence that the defence wishes to present, the judge has to decide whether that in itself has made the difference between there being no case to answer and there being a case that can properly be put to the jury. I have my doubts about how that will work. 
 I would have been much happier had the change of procedure applied only to the new offence. It would have achieved the objectives set out by the Law Commission without putting us in a position of setting a potentially dangerous procedure for the criminal courts.

Dominic Grieve: I agree with the hon. Gentleman, although the curiosity is that we do not really need the change of procedure for the new offence. It will be easy
 to lay the foundations of the new offence sufficiently to get beyond half-time if one only has to establish the basic ingredients and the potential culpability of the people concerned.

David Heath: The hon. Gentleman is right. That brings me to the second point, which is that I was much happier with the Law Commission's proposals, novel though they were. Some would argue that the statutory duty to provide a statement on the circumstances of the death was potentially a breach of human rights. I do not accept that. Obviously, there would be a risk of self-incrimination, but the requirement would have provided material from which a judge and jury could draw proper inferences in the course of a trial, and it would be connected entirely with cases under the new offence in which it was clear that, without further evidence, it would be impossible to get a satisfactory conviction on murder or manslaughter. My understanding was that the purpose of the proposals was to find a way to ensure that people did not walk free from the court because there was no possibility of securing a satisfactory conviction on murder or manslaughter. That is why we are introducing the new offences.
 I am in a quandary, because I do not want to frustrate the Government's intention, which I clearly understand. I do not want to create circumstances in which people who should be convicted are not. Equally, however, I do not want to introduce a legal nonsense into legislation, and I fear that the measure is approaching a legal nonsense in the way in which it is framed. I ask Ministers to take seriously the points that have been raised, not only in this Committee, but in another place, where some very eminent commentators on the issue made plain their reservations about what was proposed. I believe that it is possible to reformulate the provision in a more satisfactory way and to introduce better safeguards against miscarriages of justice. 
 I do not intend to oppose the Government's proposal today. However, I intend to make clear my reservations in the hope that before the Bill's later stages in the Commons and, even more important, before it goes back to another place for further consideration, we will have something that satisfies those who are much better versed in the law than I am. Otherwise, challenges are inevitable.

Hilton Dawson: I was going to make this short point in an intervention on the hon. Member for Beaconsfield. As one who is not versed in the law, I think that it is entirely appropriate to do everything that we can to increase the pressure on people who undoubtedly have information about the circumstances surrounding the death of a child, one or both of whom may well be the culprit—the person or persons who caused the death of that child.

Dominic Grieve: I do not disagree with that, but we must be realistic about the risk of so skewing the system that it invites people to lie. If the outcome of skewing the system is that people give false information to the court, it will serve no useful purpose at all in terms of establishing the truth of what occurred.

Hilton Dawson: I am grateful for the hon. Gentleman's intervention, but I would have thought that the purpose of the court is to examine forensically the information that is presented to it and, if false information is given, to expose that.

Paul Goggins: Let me start by saying that I do not for a minute underestimate the difficulty or complexity of the issue, and I do not think that any member of the Committee would do so.
 I shall begin by responding to the hon. Member for Beaconsfield. For a case of murder or manslaughter to go to full-time, the new offence must also be running. It is possible at half-time for the defence to put it to the judge that there is no case to answer on the new offence. If the judge agrees, that will be the end of the matter. As my hon. Friend the Member for Lancaster and Wyre (Mr. Dawson) said, the purpose is to hold open the prospect of murder or manslaughter being proved, so that in the process of the trial as a whole, including the evidence given in the second part of the trial, the less guilty party will give evidence that indicates who did it. That is crucial to the operation of the new offence. As I said on Second Reading and earlier today, for the new offence to be proved when it was possible to prove who was guilty of murder or manslaughter would not be full justice.

Dominic Grieve: That is the issue. I accept that we can think of theoretical models that prove that the Minister is right, but the truth is that cases will get to half-time in which the Crown has been unable to adduce the basic building blocks of a primary facie case for murder. The Minister intends the building block to be provided by the only other evidence that is likely to be adduced, which is the thoroughly tainted evidence of one or more witnesses—probably the accused or the two co-accused. That will raise very difficult issues for the judge directing the jury at the end of the trial. When linked to the fact that that will also be considered in the context of a negligence offence, for which the evidence will potentially be overwhelming against both accused, the situation will be extremely difficult for the judge to disentangle, let alone the jury.

Paul Goggins: I say again that the principles involved do not apply more widely. They apply specifically to cases involving the new offence, as I am sure the hon. Gentleman recognises. We seek real justice such that if there could be evidence regarding murder or manslaughter and there is the possibility of that charge being proved at some point during the trial, it is important to leave that possibility open throughout the whole trial.

Vera Baird: I apologise for being late. There are times when the tube stops and one does not know why. I did not speak in the main debate as it would have been rude to interrupt.
 The problem raised by the hon. Member for Beaconsfield is that of the case in which the stage has been reached where murder cannot be proved, yet the case carries on. A specific provision is needed in such cases; usually, the reason why murder cannot be proved is because one cannot say which of the 
 defendants did it. Hence the need to drive the case further and have the evidence in respect of both of them for the jury to evaluate. That, surely, is the point. Cases usually fail at half-time because one cannot say which one of them did it, not because there is not ample evidence that the child was killed by foul play.

Paul Goggins: My hon. and learned Friend is right; it may not have been possible to prove the case in the first half, but it might subsequently be possible to prove it from evidence adduced in the second half. It is precisely because we want to pursue justice through the whole of the trial in these very specific circumstances that we are proposing the procedural measures.

David Heath: I understand what the Government intend to do, and what the hon. and learned Member for Redcar (Vera Baird) hopes will happen. My concern is, where no further evidence is adduced, whether the judge can come to any conclusion other than to dismiss the case on the grounds that there is no case to answer if the circumstances up to that point are that there is no case to answer. In other words, can silence be sufficient to establish guilt for murder or manslaughter on the part of either of the accused? I suspect that it cannot be, and we should therefore narrow the scope.

Paul Goggins: Silence on its own can never be enough to prove such a case.

Lady Hermon: It is delightful to serve under your chairmanship, Dame Marion.
 Before the Minister moves on, I ask him to reflect on the time given last year to the Criminal Justice Act 2003, particularly the provisions about new and compelling evidence breaking the double jeopardy rule. Is the Minister now saying that cases involving the death of a young or vulnerable person would fall outside the provisions about new and compelling evidence?

Paul Goggins: I do not believe that they would, but I need to reflect further on the hon. Lady's point. I do not see that there is an inconsistency; all that we seek to do in specific circumstances is to hold open the possibility throughout the trial, in the second half as well as the first half, that there is a case to answer. We do not want that option to be closed at half-time when there may be evidence in the second half of the trial that can prove that somebody committed murder or manslaughter.

Dominic Grieve: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for taking so many interventions; that is what Committees are about. Is there not another danger? Being charged with murder is serious; it is a serious offence. Admittedly, the negligence offence is also very serious; it has a maximum sentence of 14 years' imprisonment, although the level of sentence will be determined by the degree of culpability identified in the defendants. If someone is charged with murder, and at half-time it is apparent to their counsel that there is no evidence and that a plea of ''no case to answer'' will be successful, it is unlikely that defendants will go into the witness box thereafter. A consequence will be they get off the murder charge; they may well be convicted on the negligence charge,
 but the court will be none the wiser as to their relative culpability in respect of the negligence. I have some slight doubt about whether the interests of justice will be widely served by discouraging people from explaining their actions in the context of the negligence charge.

Paul Goggins: The cases may or may not be proved. The procedures we propose would hold open the possibility that they could be proved throughout the whole of the trial. That is all we seek to do. The judge has a crucial role to play at full-time because the jury will be left to consider the murder or manslaughter case only if the judge decides that it is safe for them to do so—in other words, if there is evidence on which the jury could decide beyond reasonable doubt that one or other defendant is guilty. The judge must believe that there is a case to answer before the jury can be asked to make that final decision. All kinds of safeguards are built into the process; it is not a reckless process, but has been carefully considered. We seek to allow for the possibility that, in the second half of the trial, evidence may come forward that could be sufficient to convict the more guilty party of murder or manslaughter. In the interests of justice, and in the interests of children and vulnerable adults, that seems a worthwhile aim, even if the issue is complex.

Dominic Grieve: I sympathise with the aim, but it is matching the aim with the reality of what will happen during a court trial that undermines what the Government are trying to achieve.
 If I were representing a client who was facing a murder charge, and at half-time there was no evidence on which that defendant could possibly be convicted, it is most improbable that they would go into the witness box to give evidence, unless they really wished to do so. In reality, they would be advised by their legal advisers on the consequences of giving evidence in the context of the murder charge, when the murder charge could not be carried against either of the two defendants. It is therefore unlikely that much evidence will be given in those trials as a result of shifting the moment when there is ''no case to answer'' from the end of the prosecution case to the end of the defence case.

Paul Goggins: The hon. Gentleman speculates about what might happen, and he is right to do so. When the Bill becomes an Act and we see it in operation, we will learn how it works in practice.

Vera Baird: I hope that my hon. Friend does not feel that he is being used as a middleman. The hon. Member for Beaconsfield may be correct about what might happen, but the two parties will still have every interest in giving evidence on the clause 5 offence. The two elements cannot be split up, because they are in the same trial. I am not as concerned about the matter as the hon. Gentleman is. If the jury are not satisfied, they will not convict, and they will acquit with more confidence because of the existence of the clause 5 offence.

Paul Goggins: I am grateful to my hon. and learned Friend for her comments. I repeat that in order to
 leave open the possibility that there is a case to answer on murder or manslaughter, there must be a case to answer in relation to the new offence. In other words, there must be the possibility of there being sufficient evidence that one or other or both defendants committed the act. If that case is there to answer in the second half of the trial, we must leave open the possibility of there being further evidence that pinpoints which of the two or more people involved in the case did the deed. That is what we seek to achieve through the procedural change.
 The hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) commented on the Law Commission's proposals, saying that they would apply only to the new offence, but that is not quite accurate. Its proposals on adverse inferences and deferring cases to answer would apply to a wider range of offences against children. I can provide the hon. Gentleman with a list of those offences, if that would be helpful; the list is substantial, and I am sure that he would find it of interest. 
 The hon. Gentleman also commented on the statutory duty to provide a statement. I indicated that the reason why we were following a route slightly different from that recommended by the Law Commission was that we had chosen to introduce a different offence from the one that it had proposed. We did not believe that a statutory duty would be effective. It would be relevant only to children, parents and carers. It would not therefore be relevant to vulnerable adults, whom we want to protect by way of the new offence under clause 5, or to other members of the household with no caring role. We want something wider than the Law Commission proposed. 
 A duty to speak is difficult to reconcile with the right not to incriminate oneself. We have therefore built instead on the elements of the new offence. We believe that if those elements are established, the circumstances clearly call for an explanation. It is only in those circumstances that an inference can be drawn, if that is appropriate. 
 I hope that that is helpful. We have had an interesting discussion, with various interventions. I believe that the Committee is in agreement on the principle and the aim of the provision. Hon. Members of all parties have said so. There may be concerns about how it will work, but I do not believe that those are well founded. 
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 6 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 7 - Establishment and conduct of reviews

Hilton Dawson: I beg to move amendment No. 85, in clause 7, page 4, line 18, after 'death', insert 'or suicide'.

Marion Roe: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 86, in clause 7, page 4, line 18, leave out
'a person aged 16 or over'
 and insert 
'an adult or child'.
 No. 48, in clause 7, page 4, line 18, leave out 'aged 16 or over' and insert— 
'(other than a person aged 16 or under in respect of whom a Serious Case Review has been undertaken)'.

Hilton Dawson: If amendments Nos. 85 and 86 were passed, the definition of domestic homicide review under clause 7(1) would be a review of the circumstances in which the death or suicide of an adult or child had, or appeared to have, resulted from violence, abuse or neglect by the categories of persons listed—those with close personal relationships to the individual, or members of the same household.
 Liberal Democrat Members have tabled amendment No. 48. I think that we are trying to shift things in the same direction, although I would not put the same reliance on part 8 reviews. Part 8 reviews are serious case reviews undertaken following the death of a child known to child protection services. However, they were criticised by Lord Laming in his report following the Victoria Climbié inquiry. I hope that we can move to the sort of system recommended by the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, involving the establishment of independent multidisciplinary child death review teams to review all child deaths systematically. 
 That is an argument for another day, but it sets the scene for the debate, and my argument is that although the proposal for domestic homicide review is tragically welcome, it misses an opportunity to join up policy across the whole grim area of domestic violence, adult homicide, suicide and the murder of children. I hope that we may, by taking on the amendments, give full coverage of situations in which one parent kills the other, children are killed by a parent during a contact visit, or the violent parent—or, indeed, the victim of domestic violence—commits suicide. 
 I am grateful for the support from all corners of the Room for my amendments. I am also grateful for the work of Women's Aid and, above all, the assiduous commitment of its children's policy officer, Hilary Saunders, who has debated the issue with many of us on many occasions. We had a good opportunity on Monday to discuss this matter informally with my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary, who gave a sympathetic and caring response. 
 The amendments are an attempt to ensure that all deaths, in all circumstances of violence, abuse and neglect by those specified in clause 7(1)(a) and (b), will be properly reviewed. The end purpose is to ensure that lessons can be learned. In the briefing for the Bill, Hilary Saunders thoroughly dissects the part 8 review in relation to the death of a 12-year-old boy, Tony Bangs. That analysis is instructive. There had been considerable concern about domestic violence in that case, but the professionals and even the author of the part 8 review assumed that the separation of a parent would make mother and child safer. 
 Some of us have encountered such cases—I certainly have—and expressed huge relief when the 
 perpetrator of domestic violence left or was removed from a fraught and worrying family situation. One is tempted, largely on the grounds of reasonable common sense, to think that things will be better when that happens. However, as Women's Aid points out, the time of separation is precisely one of the most dangerous periods of all and can typically lead to even greater acts of violence on the part of the perpetrator towards women or children. 
 That is a good example of how knowledge of domestic violence can assist professionals reviewing such situations to develop and improve practice and to ensure that women and children are better protected in future. I look forward to hearing the comments of other hon. Members and hope for a positive response from the Solicitor-General.

Cheryl Gillan: I am delighted to support the hon. Member for Lancaster and Wyre. I am also delighted that so many hon. Members have added their name to the amendment, which I hope is an indication that the Solicitor-General will accept it. I say that in eager anticipation, because the Home Office Minister who received the amendment so well in informal discussions is not to reply to this group. Forgive me for any cynicism that I may show, but one feels that he has reserved his position and been entirely sympathetic to those in all parts of the Committee who proposed the group—I dread to use these words—on behalf of Women's Aid and the other organisations that have briefed us. I hope that the Solicitor-General will look seriously at the amendment as I deploy my arguments, because it adds to the Bill.

Lady Hermon: I am one of those who is most unhappy about the wording of clause 7. Could the hon. Lady help me to build confidence in such a vague clause? What does she understand by
''lessons to be learnt from the death''?
 For example, what is the quality of evidence? Who are the consultants? Will a consultant—or so-called consultant—watch a TV programme and then phone the police station with a piece of evidence? The review will apply in the case of a death that only ''appears'' to have resulted from violence, abuse or neglect. There does not have to be a conviction. Are the hon. Lady and others who tabled the amendment absolutely content with the wording of the clause?

Cheryl Gillan: I am not here to do the Government's job. I admit that the wording of the clause is a little woolly, and that has worried me. The Solicitor-General will probably rely on the fact that the Government intend to issue guidance to make everything clear. I do not want to pre-empt anything that the Solicitor-General says, but it will be useful to hear how the provisions will be drawn together. I hope to raise a similar point on clause stand part, should you consider that we need a clause stand part debate, Dame Marion. I hope that the Minister will respond to the hon. Lady's intervention, particularly in the light of dramatic events that hit the news recently.
 Not enough is known about the dynamics of domestic violence and what leads to death in those situations. The amendments were originally tabled in 
 the other place by Baroness Walmsley. I welcome the opportunity that they give us to create a vehicle that will allow us to build up a more comprehensive picture of the circumstances that surround domestic homicide. It would be a great shame if the Government missed this opportunity to create what could be a truly comprehensive vehicle by failing to include the deaths of children under 16, and continued to rely, as they seem intent on doing, on part 8 serious case reviews. 
 I understand that the serious case reviews apply to children under 18. By selecting the age of 16 for the clause, however, the Minister has a clumsy overlap of about two years, which seems a little odd. When this matter was discussed in the other place, Baroness Scotland merely brushed that overlap to one side. On 2 February, she said: 
''But we believe that that overlap should be kept to a minimum.''—[Official Report, House of Lords, 2 February 2004; Vol. 657, c. GC225.]
 I hope that the Minister will tell us how that overlap will be kept to a minimum, because the Government are creating more complications for themselves at a time when they are doing something particularly good in trying to create a comprehensive vehicle to analyse these situations. According to Baroness Scotland, the serious case reviews are conducted under a Department of Health provision, which is one complication. Another complication is that the domestic homicide reviews that the clause establishes will remain with the Home Office, while the part 8 reviews are a matter for the Department of Health. Those of us with ministerial experience under our belts know the horrors of anything that falls between two or three Departments.

Meg Munn: I hesitate to complicate matters, but children and social work have become the responsibility of the Department for Education and Skills, so this is probably a matter for that Department rather than for the Department of Health.

Cheryl Gillan: The hon. Lady may be right, which means that yet another Department is involved. I was merely referring to the remarks made by Baroness Scotland, which gave the impression that I described. I hope that the Minister will clarify things; it may be my ignorance. Even so, another Department is involved. My point is that involving several Departments with overlapping responsibilities complicates matters.
 During briefings on the Bill, I was also surprised to learn of the lack of statistics on the deaths of children and adults under the same heading of a violent domestic relationship. I tabled questions to the Department to try to establish what facts are held on the number of deaths of children and adults, particularly in cases in which there has been no previous contact with any of the usual agencies, such as social services. I asked someone to check the record just after the start of the Committee to see whether my questions had been answered. They were tabled on 8 June. In one, I asked the Secretary of State how many children had been killed by a parent as a result of domestic violence in each of the past five years. I put 
 the questions again to the Home Office Minister who is here this morning. They remain unanswered, so will he say when they will be answered? The information may not be readily information, and the Department may not be able to flush it out. It would be extremely useful if he would throw light on the statistics that the Department does have. 
 We have already acknowledged the complexity of domestic relations in the Bill; that recognition would be reinforced by the specific mention of suicide in the clause. Suicide is often a feature of domestic violence incidents, particularly among Asian families. I bow to the superior knowledge of the hon. Member for Keighley (Mrs. Cryer) on that, as she has done tremendous work in that area. She and I have discussed this matter on occasions, and I suspect that she may want to intervene. In many cases, we are dealing with a closed society in which pressures are put on people by family members. Such situations could well lead to suicide, and that should be recognised. 
 Back in 1993, when the Conservatives were in government, we Back Benchers got terribly excited about adding the word ''hat'' to a criminal justice Bill—I believe my hon. Friend the Member for Cotswold (Mr. Clifton-Brown) was on that Committee—which was significant because it extended powers of search to include looking under people's hats for various substances. Although we only added only one word, we felt that it was a major triumph. This amendment concerns a small word, but the acceptance of that small word would recognise people's pain and anguish, and would broaden this entire area of the Bill. The Government could well accept that change and be satisfied with it. 
 Presciently, Baroness Walmsley mentioned that people who murder family members often subsequently commit suicide. A stark example was the recent tragic case of the so-called barbecue murders, in which the alleged perpetrator committed suicide in prison. We could have no more recent illustration of the need for the amendment than that. 
 Notwithstanding the broad drafting of the clause, I sense that the Government have a strong desire to build a bank of information that can be deployed to reduce the likelihood of deaths related to domestic violence. I firmly believe that my two amendments could easily be accepted, and that they would strengthen clause 7. 
 I am impressed by the representations that I have received from organisations that have far more experience of this area than I do; I bow to their superior knowledge, and to organisations such as Women's Aid, which was mentioned by the hon. Member for Lancaster and Wyre, because they have done so much work. Women have put years of work into this area, and I urge the hon. Gentleman not to withdraw his amendment if the Minister is not minded to accept it. The Minister could strengthen the clause and satisfy a lot of people who have put a lot of work into the Bill by accepting amendments Nos. 85 and 86.

Julie Morgan: I support the amendments that were ably moved by my hon. Friend the Member for Lancaster and Wyre, and I strongly
 support the introduction of domestic homicide reviews, which is a tremendous step forward. In south Wales, we have experienced only one review, but the amount of information that we learned from it was absolutely incredible. Every agency learned from the review, and changed its practice, particularly the health service. In one case, there were 27 visits to accident and emergency, 11 assaults and nine unexplained injuries, which were suspected assaults, before a victim was killed. The accident and emergency unit has changed its practice as a result of that review. I strongly feel that the reviews are a huge step forward, from which we will learn an enormous amount.
 One finding fits in with my hon. Friend's amendments: the review found that the same sort of evidence was coming out in the domestic violence homicide review as in part 8 reviews of children, and reviews of vulnerable adults. It seemed to the people conducting the review, when they were doing the summary, that it would be much better to do the reviews together, and to take an holistic approach. It was felt that a lot of evidence was duplicated in separate reviews, and that a great deal of expertise could be built up through a more holistic approach. One conclusion of the review in south Wales was that there must be strong links between different reviews, and my hon. Friend's amendments would bring that about and be a better way to deal with the situation.

Lady Hermon: Can the hon. Lady enlighten me as to whether there was a conviction in the case that she has drawn to the Committee's attention?

Julie Morgan: Yes, there was a conviction in that case. It was a horrific case of a 51-year-old woman in a long-term relationship who was beaten to death by her partner. The review highlighted the different areas in which agencies had failed to recognise signs that the offence was likely to happen. In this and other reviews, it is important not to attach blame to agencies. The review must be a way of identifying problems and giving the agencies the opportunity to develop and improve their practice. That has been true of this review—the case has been extensively reviewed and we have probably learned more than we would have done from any training sessions or lengthy conferences. The review highlighted the important issues that we must tackle and echoed the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Lancaster and Wyre that there must be strong links between reviews of children and vulnerable adults.

Cheryl Gillan: Does the hon. Lady also agree that an added benefit of the reviews is that there is almost a form of restorative justice for the wider family, because they feel that the incident has been taken seriously and that, despite the sadness involved, lessons may be learned to prevent future harm? At a time when we are considering the benefits of restorative justice, such a review accords with that theme and is a good process for family members.

Marion Roe: I remind hon. Members that I am minded to have a stand part debate, and I ask them to concentrate on the amendments.

Julie Morgan: I agree with that intervention, Dame Marion. My concern is that the Secretary of State should not be able to choose whether to carry out a review. There should be a statutory duty that, for every victim who meets the conditions to be decided during the passage of the Bill, a review should be carried out; there should be no element of choice. We have learned so much from the review in south Wales, and I do not like to think that there would be an element of discretion about which cases are open to review.

David Heath: I shall speak briefly to the amendments that have already been introduced, and to amendment No. 48. I broadly support the introduction of the reviews, particularly because they give us a better understanding of the circumstances and allow us to build on our level of knowledge. They also allow us to learn from mistakes that have been made.
 I do not want to pre-empt the stand part debate, but it is fair to say that those with the greatest experience of these reviews have criticisms of them, which we must take note of. I am thinking particularly of the criticisms set out in the Greater London domestic violence project's response to ''Safety and Justice''. The Metropolitan police were the main promoters of that form of review in this country, and have some serious criticisms of the process, or are at least warning about the effect of the process on voluntary organisations, in particular. They are also saying that we should arrive at the widest possible view of the circumstances, rather than taking a slightly mechanistic, bureaucratic approach that considers the role of the agencies without considering the genuine circumstances of the case. We must address those warnings in the stand part debate. 
 Considering the precise terms of the amendments, it becomes clear that people are concerned because suicide is not included, and I hope that the Minister will be able to help us with that, because so often there is an association between suicide and domestic violence. It seems almost perverse not to include suicide within the scope of the reviews, if we are to learn the lessons that we want to. I hope that he will be persuaded on that. 
 There is also an important interplay between the reviews proposed by the legislation and the serious case reviews. The hon. Member for Chesham and Amersham (Mrs. Gillan) has already identified an overlap in the interface with 16 to 18-year-olds, but there are also children for whom there will not be a serious case review, simply because they fall outside the ambit of the previous legislation. We are all trying to ensure that this legislation is comprehensive, so if there is to be a database containing a body of information derived from those reviews, it should deal with all the cases in its ambit, rather than some of them. Our current concern is that there is a degree of imprecision in the proposals, and those requirements are not met. 
 One way of meeting those requirements is the proposal advanced by the hon. Member for Lancaster and Wyre, which was considered in another place by means of my noble Friend's amendments. That has the advantage of being comprehensive: whether somebody 
 is under or over 16, there will be a review. The genuine difficulty is whether there could be competing reviews covering the same ground, which will not be co-ordinated because of the serious case review. The hon. Gentleman says that I rely heavily on the serious case review, but I do not. I simply state the fact that such reviews are in statute, and will be conducted. If the Government were to suggest that there would be either a substitution or a co-ordination between the two, I would be happy. 
 However, what is currently proposed involves two reviews in parallel; if the hon. Gentleman's amendment were accepted in its current form, it would mean that every child under 16 would come to the notice of the relevant authorities. There would be two reviews happening in tandem, and I am not sure that that would be conducive to a better understanding of the circumstances of the case.

Hilton Dawson: I assure the hon. Gentleman that there is no intention of running two different reviews in tandem. The amendment is intended to deal with the point that he has overlooked: there is no guarantee that part 8 reviews will be held. That was one of Lord Laming's criticisms.

David Heath: I do not think that I overlooked it, because that is precisely what I said: there are children for whom there is no serious case review. That is why we need an extension of the current provisions to children under the age of 16. If there were to be one, it would be nonsense to have two reviews running side by side. I do not think that we disagree, other than over the precise terms being used. That potential overlap worries me, and we need precision in that area.

Cheryl Gillan: The hon. Gentleman is making a perfectly reasonable point. If the Government accepted the import of the amendments, it would be open to them to table an amendment at a later stage to ''de-duplicate'' the provisions, so that the reviews would fall under the same area, if that was what was required. That would be an option that we would all accept and support if the Government wanted to pursue it.

David Heath: Other than looking slightly askance at the neologism of ''de-duplicate'', I entirely agree with the hon. Lady. She is right; we do not have a dispute. To re-duplicate my arguments, what we are all trying to achieve is that if we have a system it should be as comprehensive as possible, given the existing statute provision and the requirements that we foresee. There are other issues that I want to raise when we come to stand part, including the role of the coroners' courts, and I hope that the Minister will be able to help us with those.
 However, for the moment I want the Committee to divide on at least one of these amendments, to demonstrate to the Government that we strongly wish to have a comprehensive and unduplicated approach. If the hon. Member for Lancaster and Wyre is minded not to press his amendment to a Division, I shall force a Division on mine, because we should demonstrate our intent. However, it would be 
 even better if the Solicitor-General were simply to say that she understands the arguments and accepts the amendments, or that she will come back with a rewording at a later stage.

Lady Hermon: The hon. Gentleman says that he wants to press the amendment to a Division. Before he does so, I ask him to reflect upon the fact that in west Belfast in Northern Ireland we have a very high suicide rate among young people—young men aged 15, 16 and 17—which is a result of paramilitary beatings rather than family relationships. How can I explain that those young people are a lesser form of victim than those who are victims because of family and domestic circumstances?

David Heath: I do not think that we are talking about lesser or greater forms of victim. We are talking about investigations from which we can derive appropriate statistical information and information of a generic quality that will enable the authorities to address issues better. I am aware that there is a specific need in Northern Ireland to deal with the appalling circumstances that the hon. Lady describes. However, I would be straying far from the amendments before us if I were to debate that now.
 The hon. Lady's point does not in any way undermine the view that where suicide is clearly associated with circumstances of domestic violence, the authorities should be aware of that. They should be able to log that for statistical purposes and make appropriate inferences for their own conduct and the performance of their duties. That is all we are trying to achieve, and it seems to me an entirely laudable aim.

Ann Cryer: I shall comment briefly on the domestic homicide review and suicide. We have heard about the conference in The Hague and the comments of experienced police officers there; suspected ''honour'' killings will be investigated in a national review of almost 120 murders by Scotland Yard, and a further 65 such reviews will take place in other parts of the country. I use the word ''honour'' in inverted commas because no honour at all is attached to those killings.
 Another fact was raised in The Hague. Four times more young women commit suicide in the Asian community than in the white community. That should be looked at in any reviews of those killings. We must ask whether these girls really committed suicide. Were they killed by parents or family, or were they pushed into suicide because of what is called izzat in Punjabi, which means the honour of the family?

Harriet Harman: Welcome to the Chair, Dame Marion. It often occurs to me that we would have better debates on amendments—this is a criticism not of you or of other Chairmen, but of our procedures—if we had the clause stand part debate first. I say that to excuse myself in advance if I should trespass on the clause stand part debate while dealing with the amendments.
 I wish to set the important points that have been made in support of the amendments in the wider context of the provision to give the Secretary of State 
 powers to direct domestic homicide reviews. We all agree with the points that have been made and there are no differences over the objectives; the question is how extensive the Secretary of State's legal powers need to be. 
 It is not unpleasant for me to hear hon. Members from all parties and from Northern Ireland saying that the provisions should go further, because that shows that this part of the Bill is important and that the House wants it to achieve its objective. That will be encouraging for people who do not want to engage in reviews, because they will realise that the whole House really intends the provisions to mean business. It will also be encouraging for bodies such as the Cardiff women's safety unit and the Metropolitan police, which have been conducting reviews on the ground, because it will show that we appreciate what they have been doing and that we want it to become national practice and to be backed by law. This has therefore been a very encouraging debate. 
 Suicide and homicide, adults and children, are inextricably linked. To give one example, the case that first caused me to propose domestic homicide reviews involved—as is so often the case—homicide and suicide, adults and children. It was the case of Jill Bluestone, who was killed by her police officer husband; he also killed two of their children, before killing himself. I realise that the amendments refer to someone who is driven to suicide by domestic violence, whereas that it was the perpetrator in the Bluestone case who committed suicide, but the issues are inextricably linked, as we shall see when I deal with the points that were made about coroners' courts. It seemed to me quite wrong that there should be a part 8 review of the death of the children in the Bluestone case, but no review of the domestic violence. The children were killed only as a result of the domestic violence. It seems wrong that there should be a review when children are killed, but a coroner's inquest, in which people look at the narrow circumstances, when an adult woman is killed and the perpetrator has killed himself. If the perpetrator does not kill himself, there is a criminal case, people wring their hands, say, ''How unfortunate!'' and walk away. Everyone agrees that we must have a review, which is why there is great support for the proposals. 
 However, it is difficult to delineate where the powers should cut in. Although I should like to see reviews in all the cases that hon. Members have raised, we shall not accept the amendments, because we think that we have done enough to include the legal powers that will, I hope, change the culture and encourage reviews of cases across the board. I had the opportunity to read the Second Reading speech by my hon. Friend the Member for Brentford and Isleworth (Ann Keen). She spoke about homicide reviews—in fact, several hon. Members who are present in Committee mentioned them. My hon. Friend said that the most common cause of miscarriages and child deaths is domestic violence—a fact that I think many hon. Members will not know. I do not want to propose other amendments that hon. Members might put to us on Report, but it could easily have been said that the Secretary of State should 
 have a power to direct such a review when an unborn child has died, given that domestic violence is such a prevalent cause of miscarriages and child deaths. We are providing a sharp, finely tuned legal power for the Secretary of State to direct, but we expect reviews to take place much more widely. We cannot in legislation predict all the circumstances that are likely to arise; the cases mentioned so far are the tip of the iceberg.

David Heath: The Solicitor-General is rapidly persuading me not to divide the Committee, but will she help me on one point? Does she understand homicide to include suicide?

Harriet Harman: No, I would say that homicide does not include suicide. I am trying to think on my feet of circumstances in which it could do, but no, I think that we are talking about manslaughter or murder.
 In response to the point made by the hon. Member for North Down (Lady Hermon), let me say that there does not have to be a conviction. An amendment introduced in another place relates to the part of the clause that says 
''or appears to have, resulted from'',
 so there does not have to be a criminal conviction before there is a review. It is important that we do not wait what might be years until there is a criminal conviction. We want to learn the lessons and start the review straight away. Sometimes the perpetrator will have committed suicide, but that is the perpetrator of a homicide. 
 When I read the Second Reading speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, North (Julie Morgan), I was struck by the fact that the Cardiff area has multi-agency reviews that do not wait for a death to occur. Those reviews consider, on a multi-agency basis, cases that are causing problems, without waiting for a homicide. Those are just the sort of cases that should be picked up before someone gets to the point of committing suicide.

Julie Morgan: Is my right hon. and learned Friend aware that as a result of those reviews—which we call multi-agency risk assessment conferences, or MARACs—the number of repeat call-outs for women who have experienced domestic violence has been drastically reduced, because the agencies are keeping on top of what is happening in each family?

Harriet Harman: I saw the very encouraging statistics showing that preventive work can work if all the agencies sit down together and discuss cases, because individually they know where the problems are mounting up. Our objective is not to need any domestic violence homicide reviews. We want to so strengthen prevention that we do not see a steady escalation of violence. Very few domestic homicides are a bolt from the blue; usually, problems have built up over time. Therefore, if we can identify the issues at an earlier stage, we should not need the very serious lessons that have to be learned following a domestic homicide.
 Amendments Nos. 85 and 86 would respectively extend the scope of domestic violence homicide reviews to cover children as well as adults, and 
 suicides as well as homicides. Amendment No. 48 would extend the scope of the reviews to cover children, but only in cases in which a child's death had not been the subject of a serious case review. I said that we are putting the provision in place so that we can learn lessons. However, we must take account of other legislation that requires other reviews, so that we do not duplicate, leave gaps or blur what should go on between the two. 
 As the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome, my hon. Friend the Member for Lancaster and Wyre and other hon. Members know, a system of serious case reviews is already in place to examine cases when a child dies and abuse or neglect are known or are suspected to be a factor in the child's death. The aim of those reviews is to enable the agencies concerned to learn lessons and to improve the way that they work together. That system covers children under the age of 18. Our aim has therefore been to create a similar scheme in relation to victims of domestic violence. We have selected the ''16 or over'' threshold to fit in with the age of consent and the legal age for marriage. Of course, all age limits are to some extent arbitrary. We recognise that there will be some overlap with serious case reviews, whose scope extends to under-18s, but we believe that it should be kept to a minimum. The provision does not say that there cannot be a domestic homicide review if someone is under 16. The clause is about the power to direct; it does not mean that agencies cannot do it if there is not a power to direct.

Hilton Dawson: I would appreciate further clarification. The problem with part 8 reviews is that the power to conduct them is permissive—whether to conduct them is at the discretion of local authorities and they do not take place in all cases of child death. Is my right hon. and learned Friend saying that there will be provision in the Bill to direct a review in cases where the option of a part 8 review has not been taken up?

Harriet Harman: If there is a case of a child death that has not been subject to a part 8 review, it is important that that is raised not only with the local authority that is responsible, but with the Minister for Children. The system should work. It is not the case that people are prevented from carrying out part 8 reviews. If there are individual cases in which a review has not taken place, they ought to be identified so that it can be made certain that there will be a review. A review is taking place and there will be some change under the Children Bill in relation to the way in which child deaths are dealt with. There will be further discussions about the concerns that my hon. Friend raised about part 8 reviews.

Cheryl Gillan: Is the Solicitor-General telling the Committee that there will be a further change in other legislation that will turn reviews into a sort of tripartite area? If so, it would appear that the Government are creating a vehicle for more confusion rather than the comprehensive provision that we were all trying to achieve via this legislation. Will she throw further light on the change to the Children Bill and how it will impact on the Bill that we are discussing? That is
 important to the arguments that we have all deployed about what the Government always like to call joined-up thinking. Judging by the contributions that have been made, we are all trying to achieve that. I am disturbed to hear that there are going to be more changes that we are not able to consider in relation the clause.

Harriet Harman: It is always difficult to disaggregate different issues, especially when they are bound up together. However, the point is that there will be a range of options and the most appropriate one can be chosen in any particular case.

David Heath: The Solicitor-General is trying desperately hard to convince us that the Government's thinking is joined-up when it is becoming increasingly obvious that it is not. Exactly what she said that she wants to happen is set out in my amendment No. 48. It says that where there is not a serious case review someone should look into the matter and direct a review. That is exactly what my amendment would achieve. She sounded as if she supported that aim. Whether she supports my amendment is irrelevant, as long as she brings in appropriate proposals to ensure that when a serious case review does not happen, something else does to ensure that the circumstances are looked into.

Harriet Harman: I am sorry to have created a sense that the thinking is not joined-up; I am obviously not explaining it well. It certainly is joined-up. We are considering the issues separately and with an overview.
 Amendment No. 85 would largely duplicate the existing arrangements for child deaths and cause a lack of clarity a local level about what type of review should be used following the death of a child. I know that some hon. Members and domestic violence organisations have expressed concern that sometimes area child protection committees do not carry out a serious case review when a child or a family has not come into contact with social services prior to the injury or death. However, that is inconsistent with the guidance set out in ''Working Together''. If the agencies do not carry out such a review and say that they did not know about it, they are not implementing the guidance, which sets out the criteria for serious case reviews and says that agencies should always conduct a review when abuse and neglect are known or suspected to be a factor in the death. That includes cases in which a child has been killed by a family member, even if there has been no prior history of abuse and no contact with statutory agencies. That is the current guidance. If that is not happening, the guidance is not being complied with and the issue should be raised.

Meg Munn: In my experience, it was enormously important that the social services inspectorate, as it was then, had an oversight role. It was often able to say to local agencies that had not considered taking up a review that they ought to do so. The process should work in a joined-up way. The new Commission for Social Care Inspection has a role in ensuring that the guidance is implemented, and there needs to be similar
 role in considering the serious case reviews in relation to domestic violence.

Harriet Harman: My hon. Friend is absolutely right. Many Members will be aware that the Children Bill, currently under discussion in the other place, will replace area child protection committees with statutory local safeguarding children boards, which will have a more strategic and proactive role in ensuring that children are effectively safeguarded.

Cheryl Gillan: I need to be clear about what the Solicitor-General is saying. As I understand it, she is reinforcing our fear that, irrespective of whether they have had contact with statutory agencies, children under 16 will be investigated under part 8 review if there is any evidence of abuse. However, I see nothing that links the part 8 review with any review that might be conducted under the clause or that provides a read-across from both instances. The Solicitor-General appears to be describing a part 8 investigation that need bear no relation to an investigation taking place under clause 7. There is no vehicle to join up what might be two separate investigations into similar circumstances. If the Solicitor-General can give me an assurance that that could not happen, I would be satisfied, but I do not think that she can. I think that the linkage is not being made and that we are being sold a bit of a pup. It therefore becomes even more imperative that she should consider accepting the amendments.

Harriet Harman: What the hon. Lady fears will happen has been taken into account. That is why I mentioned the Bluestone case, in which there was a part 8 review into the two children who were killed. Incidentally, in that case, social services and the police had already been involved in connection with injury to the children. They had already visited the family because one of the children had been injured when the father had thrown something at the mother. In that situation, because there was then no culture of or legislation on domestic homicide reviews, a part 8 review took place that examined the injury to the children and their death, but outside the context of domestic violence. We hope that a case such as the Bluestone case will never happen again because we will get better at prevention. However, should such a case arise, under the proposed legislation and the guidance that will be issued there will be a review that takes into account not only the children but the domestic violence. The situation would be considered as a piece; there would be no gaps. The gaps in dealing with the case that the hon. Lady mentioned as an example will be plugged by the legislation and the guidance that will accompany it.

Cheryl Gillan: Is the Solicitor-General telling me that any review conducted under clause 7 would be comprehensive—it would include the children and the adults involved?

Harriet Harman: Yes, if the circumstances involve both domestic violence and the death of children. None of us wants two separate and parallel reviews to take place; nor do we want a review that examines only the domestic violence and not the death of the children, or—as would happen under current legislation—a review that examined only the death of
 the children, but could not examine the context of domestic violence in which the children were killed. The legislation and its accompanying guidance will address that. We do not want two parallel reviews, or a narrowly focused review. I hope that I have reassured hon. Members on that point. The proposal is entirely sensible, and has taken account of all the points that hon. Members raised. I appear to have made it more confusing, but it is simple.

Hilton Dawson: There is a distinction between part 8 reviews, which are subject to guidance, and domestic homicide reviews, which would be subject to the direction of the Secretary of State, who would take an overall view. We may be discussing different pieces of legislation, but if there is a role for the Secretary of State in relation to domestic homicide, there should be such a role for the Secretary of State or the Minister for Children in relation to part 8 reviews. Some of us would be more satisfied if that were the case.

Harriet Harman: The provisions for reviews after the death of children are already in place and well established. If we take the Bluestone case as an example, I would expect all the agencies in such a situation to get together voluntarily and establish a review. In that sort of case, the Secretary of State—the Home Secretary—should not need to make a direction. It will be obvious what is required and the agencies will look to the guidance to determine which issues and which parties should be involved in the review. The clause enables the Secretary of State to make directions to require by statute agencies that are not otherwise prepared to participate to do so. The Met, which has tried to have voluntary reviews, has realised that it needs statutory backing, because some agencies were reluctant to participate in discussions without being clear that there was legislative weight behind them. Elsewhere, for example in Cardiff, the health authorities provided information without the need for legislation.
 Lessons need to be learned locally and policy issues need to be understood nationally. All domestic violence cases involving children and adults need to be reviewed. It will not be necessary to have a serious case review in every case in which a child has died—one would not be required, for example, after a traffic accident in which a child was killed when walking along the road with its mother. 
 Amendment No. 86 would extend the powers of the Home Secretary to order reviews to cover suicides in which violence, abuse or neglect by a current or former partner, family member or member of the same household appears to have been a factor. I am well aware of the issues that my hon. Friend the Member for Keighley, among others, has raised and I know of yesterday's conference in The Hague. The issue of domestic violence leading to suicide has been raised by a number of groups, including Women's Aid and Southall Black Sisters, as well as by hon. Members. We accept that domestic violence is often a contributory factor to the reasons for suicide. However, we are not convinced that the Secretary of State should have the power in subsection (2) to order a review. There might be circumstances in which a multi-agency review is appropriate; they are already 
 used in Cardiff. Agencies will, of course, be able to undertake such reviews; nothing in the legislation will prevent them from doing so, independent of the operation of this clause, in case of suicide. 
 Bearing in mind the points that have been raised, we should consider whether the Secretary of State's guidance on homicide reviews should include the suggestion that agencies might consider such reviews in cases of suicide in which it is felt that there is a background of domestic violence and that lessons might be learned for the future. We could well do that. We should also include issues relating to unborn children who are killed. The guidance could prompt reviews in many cases, but they do not necessarily need to be specified in the legislation. 
 The legislation says that we have to learn lessons, and it creates a wave effect and a culture change. However we do not need to legislate for every possible circumstance; that would be heavy handed. The legislation provides powers, but we want people to go beyond the letter of the law. The agencies should not need the Secretary of State's direction if they work properly together.

Cheryl Gillan: I do not disagree with any of the Solicitor-General's remarks, and am glad to hear that she is willing to consider including certain issues in guidance. However, if she is willing to go that far, surely she is willing to go so far as to insert one word in the Bill, particularly in the light of its significance for certain groups in our country—mainly the Asian community, to be frank. It would indicate that the Government mean business. As Solicitor-General, she has infinite powers and she appreciates that the amendment is not a political trick, but is a genuine attempt to put in the Bill a significant recognition of a large part of our society that suffers specifically from the problem. I urge her to tear up the notes from her officials and to give us the word that we want on the face of the Bill because of its significance.

Harriet Harman: The hon. Lady is very persuasive, but we have to continue to maintain that the power of direction is quite narrow but the way in which we want the reviews to work is much wider. We do not want people to look at the Act and say, ''Oh well, there's no direction on that. I won't do it.'' The direction is quite narrow, the guidance is wider and some activity goes beyond the guidance, which works at a local level.
 I do not want to look as if I am arguing against myself, but it would otherwise be inconsistent not to include unborn children. What about very serious injury? If someone were put into a wheelchair, or a persistent vegetative state—a coma—for life, we would want to have a multi-agency review, but the case would not be homicide. We are taking a power in a narrow circumstance and saying that we have to understand and learn lessons in a much wider set of circumstances. We cannot anticipate all the possibilities in Committee. We do not want to be exclusive, compiling a list and saying, ''That's it.'' We 
 want to take a power at the top of the issue, in relation to homicide, and work forward from there.

Vera Baird: My point is similar to that made by the hon. Member for Chesham and Amersham. Granted that the intention is that the inquiries should be wide enough to cover suicide, is it not important that we make in the Bill a bold statement that suicides are covered? Then the particular communities in which such things happen would know that. They are highly unlikely to have the guidance, and if this is in the Bill it will send out the same message as that sent out by the very existence of a Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Bill—a strong message that it will not do any more, and that we are going to look closely at the matter.

Harriet Harman: I have to repeat that it is pleasant for me to be in a position where hon. Members are urging the Government to do more. I urge hon. Members not to press the amendments, but I think that the Government will need to consider the issue further. Our position is that all such issues will be dealt with in guidance; we do not want the legislation to be too heavy, with a long list of all the problems. We have made our intentions clear.
 I see such cases week in and week out, and if the legislation were not going to cover the problem that is so clear from those cases I would not be proposing it so enthusiastically. I am with hon. Members all the way, and totally agree with the issues about ethnic minority communities, forced marriages, domestic violence and people being driven to suicide. However, the question that we are discussing is not the desired objective, but the mechanism and how wide the legislation should be. For those reasons, I hope that my hon. Friend the Member for Lancaster and Wyre will agree to withdraw the amendment. 
 I am aware that I have not dealt with the statistics issue raised by the hon. Member for Chesham and Amersham, who made a fair point. It is frustrating that because there is no offence of domestic violence—there is malicious wounding, manslaughter, murder, offences under section 18 or section 20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, and the list goes on—the system does not capture the information or the context; it captures the specific offence and does not distinguish them. 
 However, there is a new IT system arriving in the criminal justice system, called Compass. I hope that spending billions of pounds on that—on the big criminal justice system, that is—will not only help with the management of individual cases and with communication within and between the agencies, as well as providing windows for the use of victims, but will help us in our work. It will have an accountability facility, for counting and monitoring the information needed to enable us to understand what is going on, and whether what we have done works. 
 I strongly agree with the hon. Lady; we would never withhold figures. We ask the same question: how come we do not have the figures? The answer is that we do not have them, but we hope that we will have them.

Cheryl Gillan: I am grateful; the Solicitor-General and I are at one on this. I was appalled when I heard a
 briefing from Refuge about the lack of statistics. It is important that Home Office and police crime statistics should record and publish the gender of perpetrators, not simply the relationship to the child, as at present. At present the information records only that a parent is responsible. I was surprised that the gender angle was not used; I was a champion of disaggregated statistics when I was the Minister responsible for this matter. The lack of a record of the gender of the perpetrator of the crime seemed to me to create a great gap in our knowledge. I urge the Solicitor-General to do anything she can to ensure that reviews under the clause include the broader issue of pulling together real meaningful statistics.

Harriet Harman: Of course people locally, and the police officer involved, will know the gender and all sorts of other circumstances. I know that the hon. Lady does not want us to ask the police to gather more information. This is a matter of recording what they already know, because we want to understand the context, we want policies to tackle it and we want to understand whether our policies are working. Therefore monitoring is needed. I fully agree with what the hon. Lady said and hope that the Compass board will see the point that she has made in Committee.
 Several hon. Members have made points about the joining-up system. There have been discussions about the Department of Health and the Department for Education and Skills and the different departments of the criminal justice system. Perhaps I can conclude by explaining that the work is multi-agency and cross-departmental. There is no getting away from that. We are working together nationally at ministerial level, through the domestic violence ministerial group that was set up a couple of years ago. That brings Ministers together so that we do not sit in our silos but look across the piece. Domestic violence forums should be doing the same at local level. The agencies should work together. 
 Hon. Members should not feel alarmed by the mention of so many different agencies, items of legislation and Ministers. That should be seen as an encouraging sign. In the past, perhaps one part of the criminal justice system would consider the matter, and no one else.

Lady Hermon: The Solicitor-General has rightly stressed that the whole point of clause 7 is that lessons should be learned from deaths that happen in terrible circumstances. We all agree about that. She has also recommended that the review be a multi-agency review. There is already a children's commissioner in Northern Ireland—I am proud to say that we are leading the way in that—as well as a chief inspector of criminal justice, which was a very good appointment, and a justice oversight commissioner; why, then, are lessons not being learned from those important officers?

Harriet Harman: That is something that the Home Office Minister will deal with later in the Bill. We will return to those points, because we know that the hon. Lady is concerned about them.
 I ask that the amendment be withdrawn. We are starting out on something and, having argued that the reviews that hon. Members have mentioned should take place, I feel that the proposed legislative vehicle is the right one.

David Heath: I am grateful for everything that the Solicitor-General has said on this matter. It is clear that there is no difference in intent across the Committee. With all due respect to what she said, however, there is still a serious question about whether the reality matches the intent.
 I shall focus on two areas. I understand that it is the Solicitor-General's intention that where suicide results from domestic violence, there should be a review. However, the proposals define such reviews as ''domestic homicide reviews''—a definition which, based on what I understand to be her interpretation of ''homicide'', appears to exclude suicide. That is a mistake. Agencies can, of course, still hold reviews in the absence of a direction, but providing for one would strengthen the legislation. I ask the Solicitor-General to consider the matter again. If the word ''homicide'' were not included, there would be a review of the circumstances in which the death of a person 
''has, or appears to have, resulted from violence, abuse or neglect''.
 That would cover suicide resulting from domestic violence—but calling the reviews ''domestic homicide reviews'' at least implies that suicide is not covered, so I ask the Solicitor-General to consider the matter again. 
 The other important question is how the provisions apply to children under 16. It does not seem entirely logical to propose a power of direction in cases involving those who are over 16, but no comparable power in cases involving those who are under 16. The Solicitor-General said that there would always be a serious case review for a person under 16, yet practitioners tell us that that is not exclusively the case. She said that such provision was underpinned by previous legislation, yet, again, practitioners tell us that that is not necessarily the case. 
 The Solicitor-General said that the Children Bill would strengthen the process, but I have struggled to find any explicit mention of such matters in that Bill. I believe that they might be covered by clause 12 of that Bill, which is rather unpromisingly headed ''LSCBs: supplementary''. However, that clause does not mention the process in any way and merely says that the Secretary of State may issue guidance—not direction—to the proposed local safeguarding children boards. 
 There is a potential difficulty. I want every death to be subject either to a section 8 review or to a review under clause 7, but I cannot see the statutory basis to ensure that that would happen. Perhaps the Government have in mind further amendments to the Children Bill to introduce that power of direction. If so, that may cover the difficulty. However, there appears to be a gap in the middle, albeit an unintended one, and hon. Members in all parts of the Committee who have spoken on the matter are worried about that. Just because there is a permissive power, we cannot necessarily assume that a review will be 
 conducted; otherwise we would not need the clause at all.

Cheryl Gillan: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way, as I believe I do not have the right to speak further on the amendment and can now make my points only in interventions. Having looked at the Children Bill and knowing that legislation on the matter is being considered, does the hon. Gentleman agree that it would be sensible for the Solicitor-General to draw stumps on the whole issue and undertake to amend the clause on Report? I hope to examine on clause stand part what we should do with the information gained and the lessons learned. Who will learn the lessons, and how will the information be disseminated? It is becoming clearer to me that there is less evidence of joined-up thinking on the matter than members of the Committee, irrespective of their political persuasion, desire.

David Heath: There is clearly a shared destination; I agree with the hon. Lady that it would be helpful if the Solicitor-General intervened to say that she would reconsider the matter and discuss it with her colleagues.

Harriet Harman: Does the hon. Gentleman understand that the correct position is that when a child has been abused or murdered there will be a special case review, and if there is an unexpected death of a child, there will be screening to see whether a special case review is necessary? If the death is due to a traffic accident, for example, and there is nothing complicated about it, a review will not be needed.
 I did not go into a huge amount of detail about the circumstances in which child abuse reviews will be held; under the Children Bill, the local safeguarding children boards will have more guidance about when and how to hold the reviews; straightforward child abuse is for that Bill to deal with. The matter that the hon. Gentleman has raised is related to that measure, not to one on domestic violence. Is he aware of that?

David Heath: I can only go by the Bill before me as amended in Committee, which does not specifically cover those matters, and by the advice of practitioners whose judgment I trust, who say that the power to direct does not exist at present. Members on both sides of the Committee want a proposal that states that where the death of someone aged under 16 has resulted, or appears to have resulted, from violence, abuse or neglect by persons to whom he or she may be related, and so on, that will invariably result in a review.
 Perhaps the right hon. Lady will write to us about the matter. The NSPCC is advising us, and it may have got things wrong, but members of the Committee need to know that there is not a gap in the legislation. If we can be satisfied about that, there is no difference between us, as we all have the same objective, and we will not need to return to the subject. But at present, the clear advice is that there is a gap that needs to be filled. Some of us remain to be satisfied that that will be written into the law, as opposed to the guidance.

Hilton Dawson: There is huge consensus, even unanimity, in the Committee on the seriousness of these issues, but there remain matters on which we need to be satisfied. I have no intention of pressing the amendment to a Division, not because I disagree with the principles, but because I am wary of compounding difficulties in an area of such extreme importance.
 I ask my right Friend the Solicitor-General if she and the Minister for Children will co-operate to produce an integrated statement about how the policies and legislation will work together. Hon. Members want to know from both Ministers how they and the rest of the Government believe that that would work in practice. If any change in legislation is needed, let us consider it together.

Cheryl Gillan: The hon. Gentleman was particularly knowledgeable in moving the amendment, and I am disappointed that he is considering withdrawing it. If he does so, I shall table the amendments again on Report and force a vote on the Floor of the House. Hon. Members on both sides have made valid points, and I want to give the Minister the opportunity to table the amendments herself on Report, because it would be a shame if we do not shape this legislation in that way. At the start of the Bill's passage, the Minister assured us that the Government would listen to reasonable Opposition amendments. I am sad that the hon. Gentleman is withdrawing his amendment, because I believe that there would be a winning majority for it. Hon. Members on both sides have put their names to it, so he is missing an opportunity. I suggest Report stage to the hon. Gentleman as another route.

Hilton Dawson: I thank the hon. Lady. I would press the amendment if I believed that there was a serious purpose in doing so—but the important thing is to stress the need for integration throughout government, and to ensure that the Government work extremely effectively in this area. We should not amend the legislation inappropriately and end up not achieving what we all seek to achieve.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: The hon. Gentleman signed the amendments with the serious intent that they should be put into law. If he withdraws the lead amendment now, he will send a very strong signal to all those organisations that wanted us to table the amendments with which it is grouped.

Hilton Dawson: The party political divide is showing itself. In all seriousness, I believe that my right hon. Friend the Solicitor-General, the Minister for Children and officials from the whole range of Government offices will clarify this very important point. If there is a point to further legislation, I hope that that legislation will be produced. If existing guidance and the development of policy under the Children Bill will deal effectively with these issues, I see no point in taking part in the further distraction that pressing the amendment would entail. For that reason I shall withdraw it, but I hope that my right hon. Friend will support the Committee by providing good, clear information about the way in which the various aspects of policy will operate. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Cheryl Gillan: I beg to move amendment No. 84, in clause 7, page 4, line 42, at end insert—
'Mental Health Trusts 
 Members of any educational establishment'.
 I rise to my feet with a heavy heart, because I have rarely seen someone duck the opportunity to change a Bill when he has been told that there is an obvious majority in favour of an amendment. I am almost speechless. 
 Amendment No. 84 is a simple amendment that would add two more categories under subsection (4)(a): mental health trusts and members of any educational establishment. I almost anticipate what the Solicitor-General will— 
 It being twenty-five minutes past Eleven o'clock, The Chairman adjourned the Committee without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order. 
 Adjourned till this day at half-past Two o'clock.